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16NOTES

THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
In his now antique treatise on torts, Judge Cooley recognized in
our law the right "to be let alone."' Judge Cooley's phrase and a
handful of English cases2 were cited in the famous 1890 Harvard Law
Review Article 3 by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis advocating recognition of the invasion of an individual's privacy as a
separate tortious wrong. Warren and Brandeis argued that the
law should afford protection for an individual's personality and peace
of mind as well as for his person. Their article traced the development of other areas of tort law, from an original protection of physical safety to the eventual protection of the individual's spiritual and
mental tranquility; such as the development of the tort of battery
and protection from physical harm, into assault and protection from
the fear of harm. Warren and Brandeis pointed out that as society
becomes increasingly complex and the interaction among individuals
becomes more organized and refined, the common law should recognize
a right to mental tranquility as well as physical safety. This is particularly true, they said, in view of the development of the mass news
media, which have the ability to publicize the private life of an individual with relative ease. This dissemination to a vast segment of
the population could greatly injure the individual involved.
As Warren and Brandeis envisioned this new tort, it would afford
one protection from unwanted publicity of his private life. It would
allow a redress for a person who is forced into the limelight of public
scrutiny without his permission. Every individual has the right to
live his life without the interference that results from bringing his
neighbors' attention to his private activities. Of course, Brandeis and
Warren realized that the right of privacy is not absolute, and there
is a legitimate area in which the press and other news media are warranted in intruding into the privacy of an individual. Freedom of
the press must be balanced against an individual's right of privacy in
order to determine where the line should be drawn. A right of legal
redress exists only for invasions outside this legitimate area, which
are unwarranted and unreasonable to an ordinary man of normal
sensibilities. This conflict between freedom of the press and invasion
of privacy will be discussed below.
The appearance of the Warren-Brandeis article encouraged many
courts, already concerned about the abuses of the press and protection
of the individual's private life, to frankly recognize invasion of privacy
as a tort, thereby creating the right to be let alone. The new tort was
1. CooLEY,TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
2. Parton v. Prang, 3 Clifford 537 (1872); Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (1769);
Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815 (1854).
3. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.L. REv. 193 (1890).
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off to a stormy start, however, when its recognition was squarely presented to the New York Court of Appeals in Roberson v. Rochester
FoldingBox Co.4 in the year 1902. That court, in a four-to-three decision, refused to recognize a right of action in invasion of privacy.
The plaintiff was a young lady whose picture was used, without her
permission, in advertising a brand of flour with the caption "Flour
of the Family." She alleged great embarrassment and humiliation as
a result of this unauthorized publicity. The refusal to recognize
invasion of privacy created a storm of controversy over the existence
of the new tort with the result that the New York legislature enacted
a statute5 in the next session creating a right of action in tort for
such invasions of privacy. This statute remains the law today in that
state. 6
The significant turning point in the development of the tort of invasion of privacy came in 1905 with Pavesich v. New England Life
Insurance Co.7 In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court allowed the
plaintiff to bring an action against an insurance company for publishing his picture in a newspaper as part of an insurance advertisement. The plaintiff, as an artist whose values were primarily aesthetic, was particularly upset by the commercialization of his personality.
The Pavesich case cites the Warren-Brandeis article and the dissent
in Roberson as authority for the recognition of this new cause of
action, invasion of privacy. This case represents the first unequivocal
judicial pronouncement that the law protects the right to be let
alone. The often cited Pavesich case set the tenor for later decisions
and has contributed significantly to what is today the modern right
to be let alone.
By 1944 thirteen jurisdictions8 had recognized a right of action
protecting the right of privacy when the Florida Supreme Court
handed down its opinion in Cason v. Baskin.9 In that case the court
was squarely faced for the first time with the necessity of either recognizing or rejecting the existence of the tort of invasion of privacy.
4.

171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).

5.

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 132, §§1-2.

6. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§50-51.
7. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
8. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Pavesich v. New
England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); State ex rel. Mavitz
v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Kunz v. Alien, 102 Kan. 883, 172

Pac. 532 (1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W. 364 (1909);
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905); Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 At. 34
(1929); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938); Friedman
v. Cincinnati Local Joint Executive Bd., 20 Ohio Op. 473 (1941); Hinish v. Meier
& F. Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C.
543 (L.P. 1940); Peed v. Washington Times Co., 55 Wash. L. Rep. 182 (1927).
9. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
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The court held that the right of privacy was a right that should be
protected by the courts and therefore allowed the plaintiff to bring
her action in invasion of privacy. The suit was brought by Miss
Cason as a result of being portrayed as "profane" in Marjorie Kinnan
Rawlings' Cross Creek.'0 The book contained an account of the plaintiff and the author making a trip to take the population census. In
that passage the plaintiff is portrayed as a profane, but benevolent,
old spinster. She brought suit against Miss Rawlings alleging that
the seclusion of her private life and home had been invaded through
publication of her activities and exploitation of her name and personality. The complaint stated that this publicity caused her great
mental pain and personal injury. She claimed damages in the amount
of one hundred thousand dollars. The court's opinion quoted extensively from the Warren-Brandeis article and cited earlier decisions,
including Pavesich, recognizing the cause of action. Cason is a landmark decision in Florida law because at the time it was handed
down it placed Florida on an advancing fringe of tort law, a position
soon to be embraced by the majority of American courts.- Since
1947 there have been seven other reported decisions in Florida involving invasion of privacy. From these cases an outline of the fullblown tort, invasion of privacy, has begun to take form. This note
will attempt to analyze these cases to determine how the right to be
let alone has developed in Florida.
The modern tort of invasion of privacy actually seems to encompass several distinct torts.' 2 These causes of action are lumped together under invasion of privacy because they have one common denominator - they all involve the right of any individual to live his life
without interference from others as long as it involves nothing offensive or extraordinary so as to make his day-to-day affairs the subject
of public interest. Dean Prosser lists four separate wrongs for which
an action in invasion of privacy will lie: intrusion, public disclosure
of private facts, false light in the public eye, and appropriation. The
courts, however, do not always make it clear that they recognize
these distinctions and, if they do, which one of the protected interests
of the plaintiff is being violated.
INTRUSION

Of the four separate torts encompassed by invasion of privacy, intrusion is probably the most recently and poorly developed. Although
the name "invasion of privacy," taken in its ordinary meaning would
seem most dearly to cover physical intrusion into the private dwelling
10.

RAWLINGS, CROSS CREEK 3 (1942).

11.
12.

PROSSER, TORTS §112 (3d ed. 1964).
Ibid.
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or solitude of an individual, it has only been within recent years that
the law has been expanded to cover such a situation. It is not clear
whether Warren and Brandeis contemplated that their brainchild
would protect the right to be free from physical intrusion in the
home or other private place. Publicity is not an essential element for
a recovery for physical intrusion into a private place as it is for the
other wrongs caused by invasion of privacy. It is only required that
the defendant intrude without authority. Very few United States
courts have considered whether intrusion into private quarters is
actionable under invasion of privacy. 3 Some courts, however, have
allowed a recovery for such an intrusion under the guise of other
torts such as trespass quare clausam fregit,4 mental distress,1 5 or assault.16 These decisions are much earlier, and today those same courts
would probably frankly recognize that the right they were actually
protecting was the right of privacy. The recent decisions indicate
that the courts are beginning to move toward such a position and
to some extent invasion of privacy may be displacing the older forms to
action. 7 Florida is among the states that have recognized this right.
In a recent Florida case, Thompson v. City of Jacksonville,'8 the
First District Court of Appeal allowed a cause of action in negligent
invasion of privacy for the physical intrusion into the plaintiff's
living quarters. Police officers of the city of Jacksonville intruded
into the plaintiff's dwelling place without a search warrant or probable cause and allegedly caused her great mental pain, suffering,
humiliation, and embarrassment. The plaintiff brought her action
against the city of Jacksonville, seeking compensatory and punitive
damages. The court said such a physical invasion into the living
quarters of the plaintiff could be the basis for an action in invasion
of privacy. Florida follows the majority of courts in apparently not
requiring any publication of the intrusion in order to state a good
cause of action for invasion of privacy. Although the court did not
discuss the publicity question in Thompson there was no publication
alleged and the court said the complaint was sufficient.
In another recent case the Third District Court of Appeal held an
action for invasion of privacy would lie against the newspaper for
13. Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 Fed. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); Disheroon v. Brock, 213
Ala. 637, 105 So. 899 (1925); Byfield v. Candler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905
(1924).
14. Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880).
15. Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902).
16. McGlone v. Hauger, 56 Ind. App. 243, 104 N.E. 116 (1913).
17. Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 132 S.E.2d 206, rev'd on
other grounds, 219 Ga. 505, 134 S.E.2d 32 (1963); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont.
517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
18. 130 So. 2d 105 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla.
1962).
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persistent telephone calls that were the result of an item in a Miami
newspaper column that read, "Wanna hear a sexy telephone voice?
Call __
and ask for Louise."':9 The number listed was the business
office in which the plaintiff was employed. This decision clearly indicates an action for physical intrusion into privacy will lie for mere
telephoning. Although the opinion speaks of the publicity the plaintiff received in the newspaper column, the decision can probably be
properly read as an intrusion case. This is quite an extension of the
protection from physical intrusion recognized by other states. Most
other courts have limited such an action to cases involving actual
physical presence in the private quarters of the plaintiff. In a subsequently reported Florida circuit court case, Britt v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,2 0 however, it was held that a telephone
company could not be held liable for invasion of privacy for inadvertently listing the plaintiff's telephone number under another person's name, which resulted in the plaintiff receiving many unwelcomed
phone calls for "Charley," much to her husband's irritation. In that
case the court said the element of foreseeability of intrusion was
missing and therefore the complaint was dismissed.
When these three cases are viewed together, the vague outline of
the tort of physical intrusion included under the heading of an invasion of privacy emerges. Although the intrusion upon the plaintiff
must be into a place that is private, as opposed to public, an office
building can be a private place. It appears that most of these cases
will arise in situations similar to that in Thompson, but the courts
recognize this right when the defendant is not physically present in
the plaintiff's quarters. Most other states have required some serious
intrusion into the solitude of the plaintiff. It has been held that disturbing noises,21 bad manners, 22 or harsh or insulting manners2 3 are
not sufficient to support this action. In Florida, however, continued
telephoning unaccompanied by any physical presence of the defendant is enough; thus, Florida may be recognizing a more liberal rule
than the majority of jurisdictions. It is clear in Florida and other
states that the intrusion must be of an offensive nature to the reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. Also, if the Britt case is accepted
as the law in this state, and there appears to be no reason for it not
to be, it is necessary that the consequences to the plaintiff be reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the time he committed the
19. Harms v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
20. 21 Fla. Supp. 72 (4th Cir. 1968).
21. Owen v. Henman, 1 W. g-S. 548 (Pa. 1841).
22. Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903); Christie v. Greenleaf, 78
Pa. D. & C. 191 (C.P. 1951).
23. Halliday v. Cienkowski, 32 Pa. D. & C. 410 (C.P. 1938), aff'd, 333 Pa. 123,
3 A.2d 372 (1939).
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acts that resulted in an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy when the
plaintiff alleges negligent invasion of privacy.
Although the case law in Florida has not entirely delineated the
boundaries as to public versus private places, it does seem clear from
the decisions in other states that the circumstances involved in each
case will be determinative. It has been held that there is no right to
privacy on a public street;2 4 however, trailing the plaintiff on a public
street so that it was apparent to the general public the plaintiff was
being followed has been held to be an actionable tort. 25 Also, wiretapping to the plaintiff's home has been held an intrusion on the
privacy of an individual when the defendant listened to conversations
of the plaintiff and his family. 26 A hospital room has been recognized
as a private place into which a defendant can intrude by listening to
2
conversations in an adjoining room by use of electrical equipment,
but the courts generally hold that plaintiff cannot recover from an adjoining landowner who builds his house so as to position his windows
to look into the plaintiff's house.2 8 In one case, however, it was held
that plaintiff could recover when an elevated railroad behind the
plaintiff's house allowed its passengers to peer into her home.2 9 The
conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the circumstances
surrounding each case are most important in determining whether the
intrusion was sufficient to warrant a recovery, and not any formal
distinction between public versus private places.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS

It is said that an individual has a right to have the private facts
of his day-to-day life remain private, and the courts have extended
legal protection to the individual for that right. An action for invasion of privacy will lie in favor of a plaintiff whose private life
has received highly objectionable publicity even though the facts
disclosed are true. The leading case in this area arose in California,
and allowed recovery for the public showing of a motion picture of
the life story of a reformed prostitute, without the plaintiff's permission.30 The picture disclosed the present identity of the former
prostitute, much to her consternation. This case received much
24. People v. Weiler, 179 N.Y. 46, 71 N.E. 462 (1904); Forster v. Manchester,
410 Pa. 192, 189 A.2d 147 (1963).
25. Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139
NAV. 386 (1913).
26. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
27. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939).
28. Schafer v. Baker, 16 App. D.C. 213 (D.C. Cir. 1900); Cohen v. Perrino, 355
Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947).
29. Moore v. New York Elevated Ry., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892).
30. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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notoriety because of its startling facts, and many courts took positions similar to the one in this California case. Florida has allowed
such a recovery in Pattersonv. Tribune Co. 31 In that case the Tampa
Tribune printed in its "News of Record" section information taken
from the Hillsborough County progress docket concerning the plaintiff's committment for treatment as a narcotics addict. Presence of
the information on the progress docket of the Hillsborough County
Circuit Court was in violation of a Florida statute, 32 which made it
unlawful to place the name of a voluntarily committed addict on
the public records. The Second District Court of Appeal said this
statute created a right of privacy in the plaintiff and that the Tampa
Tribune was charged with the knowledge of that right. The court
reversed the summary judgment for defendant granted by the trial
court and ordered the case remanded for trial. It is interesting to
note that the plaintiff did not deny the truth of the matter printed,
but only that it was a private matter regardless of its truth and that
public disclosure greatly injured her. The court also pointed out
that the innocence of the defendant in acquiring the information was
not a defense.
A necessary element of the right to bring an action for public
disclosure of private facts is publicity. 33 This publicity was by newspaper publication in Patterson, but a federal district court applying
Florida law has held that oral publication, by word of mouth, is
sufficient when it involves a considerable number of people and is
highly embarrasing to the plaintiff.34 This position is probably a
minority view today, although almost every state has allowed oral
publication when it was by way of radio or television.
This action seems to somewhat overlap an action for defamation
of character. The only real difference between the two actions appears
to be that while truth is an adequate defense in a defamation action,
it makes no difference in an action for public disclosure of private
facts whether the facts disclosed were true or false. Some writers have
predicted that invasion of privacy may in many cases displace dedefamation. 35 This prediction seems justified. What plaintiff's attorney will bring an action in defamation if he can obtain the same
recovery in an invasion of privacy suit and deprive the defendant of
an important defense at the same time? Also, because the truth of
the disclosure is irrelevant, the plaintiff need not worry about having
the defendant present evidence of its truth and thereby embarrass
31.
32.
33.
54.
35.

146 So. 2d 623 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1962).
Fla. Stat. §398.18 (1) (1963).
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
See Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093

(1962).
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the plaintiff in a public trial. Thus, a great deterrent to bringing
court action may be avoided by suing in invasion of privacy rather
than in defamation.
FALSE LIGHT IN THE PUBLIC EYE

An action for invasion of privacy will lie for causing the plaintiff
to be viewed in a false light in the public eye. This action is also very
similar to an action for defamation and may to some extent take the
place of that action. Invasion of privacy is often brought when the
plaintiff's picture is used in a publication in such a way as to give a
false impression of him. The action differs from one in defamation
in that in invasion of privacy the statement or picture must give a
false impression of the plaintiff, but it is not necessary that it be defamatory to justify a recovery. The practical significance of this distinction is that a plaintiff who cannot prove defamation per se or
special damages, nevertheless has a cause of action upon which to
recover for his mental anguish.
There appear to be two cases in Florida that involve placing the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. In Jacova v. Southern
Radio & Television Co.36 the Florida Supreme Court refused to allow
the plaintiff to recover when his picture was shown on television in
a scene described by a commentator as an arrest of gambling hoodlums. In the short sequence, the plaintiff was shown being questioned
by police officers in a cigar store where the gambling arrests were
made. The plaintiff was a casual bystander who was in the store only
by coincidence. In the complaint he alleged that the film and the
commentary made it appear he was being arrested for gambling. The
court, although recognizing the right of action the plaintiff sought
to bring, concluded that the plaintiff was not portrayed as a gambler
but merely as an innocent bystander. The court said when a person
becomes an actor, willingly or not, in an occurrence of public interest,
he emerges from his seclusion and it is not an invasion of his right
of privacy to publish his photograph with an account of the occurrence. In Jacova the court felt the plaintiff's right to privacy was outweighed by the public's right to receive information from the news
media. This limitation on the right to privacy is discussed more
thoroughly in the section "Limitations and Defenses" below.
The second Florida case that involved the placing of a plaintiff in
a false light in the public eye, Santiestebanv. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,37 was a so-called debtor harrassment case. Santiesteban, an em-

ployee of a country club, had purchased tires and tubes for his automobile from Goodyear. Although he was current in his payments,
36.
37.

83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
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Goodyear mistakenly thought he was in arrears, removed the tires
and tubes, and left the car sitting on its rims in the parking lot of
the country club where the plaintiff worked. Plaintiff was laughed at
and harrassed by his fellow employees and was greatly embarrassed
when his employer asked him to have the car removed from the
parking lot because of its unsightliness. Plaintiff brought his action
seeking compensatory and punitive damages for invasion of his right
to privacy. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Florida granted a motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the complaint stated a good
cause of action for invasion of privacy and remanded the case for
trial. The court pointed out that the presence of the car in a public
parking lot was sufficient "demonstrative publication" to comply with
the publication requirement. This position is unique among the
courts of the United States. No other jurisdiction seems to have as
liberal a publication rule as Florida. Most other courts have indicated,
however, that oral communication is sufficient if accomplished over
the radio or television. Another significant feature of Santiesteban is
the fact that the outrageous collection methods of a creditor were
held actionable in a suit for invasion of privacy. This holding places
Florida among the majority of the courts that have considered the
question38 whether invasion of privacy will lie for debtor harrassment
cases.
A few conclusions can be drawn from the two Florida decisions,
Santiesteban and Jacova, involving this right to be free from false
publicity. Among them is that the publicity requirement will be
met in Florida by writing, oral communications, or demonstrative
publicity. As pointed out by the Jacova decision, innocence or lack
of malice is no defense to the action. The adverse publicity to the
plaintiff must not only be untrue, but must be clear and unequivocal
although it need not be defamatory. With the exception of the
liberal publicity requirement, Florida seems to be developing at about
the same rate and in the same direction as the other states that have
recognized the right of action of invasion of privacy in the specific
area of false publicity to the plaintiff.
APPROPRIATION

Appropriation of an individual's personality or likeness is actionable as an invasion of privacy. This is the oldest and most well
developed form of the tort, and is recognized in every state now protecting the right to privacy. The case of Cason v. Baskin,3 9 discussed
38. See cases collected in Smith & Straske, Collection Procedures and Right of
Privacy, 36 FLA. B.J. 1085 (1962).
39. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
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above, involved the appropriation by the defendant of the plaintiff's personality in the book Cross Creek. In that case the court
stated that the passage in the novel describing the plaintiff was, in
effect, a pen sketch of the plaintiff and was actionable as an invasion
of her privacy. Generally, the courts have limited a recovery for personality appropriation to cases in which it was accomplished for a
commercial purpose. This probably is due to the turbulent beginning
of the tort in the New York Roberson case. 40 The statute passed by
the legislature as a result of that case specifically limited recoveries to
cases of commercial appropriation. Because of the frequent citation
to the New York cases interpreting this statute the commercial limitation has crept into the tort. It is not clear whether Florida will
limit a recovery for appropriation of the personality in this manner,
but in view of a strong trend in this direction displayed by other
courts it is probable that Florida will adopt this limitation. 41
The mere use of another's name is not actionable unless it is used
to some personal advantage by the defendant. With this exception,
tort law puts no restrictions on the free use of any name. In Cason
the court said use of the name "Zelma," the first name of the plaintiff, by itself was not sufficient to identify the plaintiff, but when accompanied by the description of the plaintiff in the light of the
monetary advantage to the defendant it was actionable. In Jacova it
was decided that an invasion of privacy by publication of the plaintiff's picture on television was not actionable because it was merely
incidental to the right of the press to print or telecast the news. Although some courts have talked in terms of a property right in a name
or picture, 4 2 Florida has taken what appears to be the better view
and frankly recognized it is the right of privacy that is breached in
43
these cases, not a property interest.
It is clear that special damages need not be alleged in order to
state a good cause of action for invasion of privacy. Special damages,
however, are recoverable in cases in which the defendant's acts were
44
malicious or intentional. In the second appeal of Cason v. Baskin
the Florida Supreme Court held the plaintiff was entitled to at least
nominal damages and remanded the case for a new trial.
With only one Florida case squarely on point the limits of the
right of privacy for appropriation of personality are still somewhat
obscure, although it is clear that the right does exist in Florida.

40.
41.
42.

Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
See Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908),

afl'd, 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
43. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944).
44. Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
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LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSES

It is generally recognized that the right to privacy is not an absolute right, but rather has several limitations. 45 The main limitation
on the right to privacy arises when it comes into conflict with the
freedom of the press guaranteed by the first amendment. The right
of the public to have fast, accurate, and comprehensive news coverage
justifies the infringment upon an individual's right to privacy when
he becomes involved in a newsworthy event. Florida recognizes this
limitation and based its decision in Jacova on the necessity of a
free press.
A person may also lose the right to keep certain details of his
private life secret because he is a public figure.46 Just about every
event in the life of the President of the United States is newsworthy,
and certainly no action for invasion of privacy would lie for publishing his daffy activities. On the other hand, the fact that a person
purposefully submits himself to public scrutiny, such as entertaining
or prize fighting, does not take all his private life outside of the
protection afforded by the right to privacy. Florida recognizes this
restriction on publicizing the details of a public official's life. In
Battaglia v. Adams,47 it was held that Richard Nixon's name should
be struck from the primary ballot in Florida at Mr. Nixon's request.
The court said the right to place Mr. Nixon's name on the ballot
rested solely with him and if it were on the ballot after he requested
it be withdrawn, it would be an invasion of his privacy.
Another limitation on the action requires that the invasion of
privacy complained of be foreseeable by the defendant at the time
he commits the acts that result in invasion of the plaintiff's privacy.
Florida recognized this foreseeability requirement in Britt48 when
it held it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff's privacy would be invaded by incorrectly listing his telephone number under another
name.
No action will lie for a very minor invasion of privacy. The mere
mention of a person's name in the newspaper or on the radio or television will not impose liability for invasion of privacy.49 As the court
pointed out in Jacova, some minor invasions of privacy are naturally
incident to our complex way of life and no action will lie in these
cases. The Restatement of Torts takes the position that invasion of

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
Ibid.
164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
Britt v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 Fla. Supp. 72 (4th Cir. 1963).
Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., supra note 45.
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privacy is only actionable when a "serious interference" with the
50
plaintiff's right to privacy occurs.
An often employed defense in invasion of privacy cases is consent.
The defendant alleges that the plaintiff willingly allowed the defendant to invade the plaintiff's property.51 This defense, which can be
either contractual or gratuitous, is an absolute bar to the action if
proved. A gratuitous consent can be withdrawn any time before
publication; however, if the consent was secured by contract, a withdrawal by the plaintiff is usually of no effect.
CONCLUSION

The seed sown by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 seems to be in
full bloom today. "The right to be let alone" is now well entrenched
as a part of our tort law. Florida was one of the first states to afford
individual privacy the protection of law and today that protection
is one of the most comprehensive and well developed in the United
States.
It appears that invasion of privacy may displace some of the
older, traditional tort causes of action in many instances. Because
invasion of privacy did not develop out of the common law of trespass
and trespass on the case, as many of our other present day torts did,
it is not burdened with those vestiges of the past that the older torts
bear. Mr. Prosser calls the development of invasion of privacy an
outstanding example of the influence of legal periodicals in our law.
As a result of its recent development the courts have been free to shape
this new tort to fit the needs of today's society and have not had to
wrestle with the dead hand of history.
The four distinct wrongs made actionable as invasion of privacy
seem somewhat unrelated and factually dissimilar. When it is realized,
however, that in each case the real interest protected is the right
to be let alone, then the inclusion of these wrongs seems justified.
As this new tort develops under the influence of the writers in the
field it is probable that the courts will begin to more clearly distinguish the cases and place them more distinctly within one of the
four categories of wrongs. This may result in the division of the tort
into four independent causes of action. Although it is really too
early to make any reliable predictions as to the possible division of
the tort, it can be said with confidence that the right to be let alone
will undoubtedly be expanded and refined very rapidly in the near
future.
RICHARD H. ADAMS, JR.
50. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §867 (1939).
51. Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
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